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by David Callahan
Seismic events in world politics tend to pro-duce a well-spring of speculation aboutwhat will happen next. The two world wars
were followed by intense discussions of what the
world would look like in the future and, more
importantly, what it should look like. After the end
of the Cold War, political scientists and other seers
were busy through the 1990s debating the future
of international affairs and U.S foreign policy. 
As often as not, prognostications made in the
immediate aftermath of a major event in world
politics are wrong, as is much of the policy analysis
and advice informed by these predictions. New ter-
rain in international affairs has a way of disorient-
ing even the most seasoned observers.   
The terrorist attacks of September 11th and the war
in Afghanistan provide the latest test of our ability
to look ahead and accurately divine the shape of
things to come. America is now in a strange and
unforeseen landscape: a massive, nearly unimagin-
able, blow against the homeland followed by an
open ended conflict with many fronts. The debate
over how the world and U.S. foreign policy will be
changed by these events is only beginning, but sev-
eral key ideas have already taken hold. Perhaps the
most popular idea is that the struggle against terror-
ism will largely define national security strategy in
the years ahead. The Bush Administration, echoed
by many of its allies, has articulated a vision of a
long twilight struggle against terrorists and “evil”
rogue states that rivals the cold war doctrine of con-
tainment in its sense of historic scope. 
A second idea is that conflict between modern and
traditional populations, manifested by clashes of reli-
gions and cultures, will be a major driver of world
politics. This vision of the future is closely related to
a third idea with a wide following: That world poli-
tics will increasingly be defined by battles between
the rich and poor—between those who are benefit-
ing from the fruits of an increasingly globalized
world economic system and the great masses of peo-
ple who are shut out of such prosperity. 
Each of these ideas holds important clues about the
future. But something is sorely missing from cur-
rent debates: An appreciation of the decisive role
that self-determination movements and ethnic con-
flict will likely have in shaping world politics and
American foreign policy in the decades ahead.* 
During much of the 1990s, self-determination
issues received a tremendous amount of attention,
and for good reason. Conflicts between different
ethnic groups in Bosnia, Rwanda, Kosovo, and the
former Soviet Union dominated international news
and drew NATO, America and the United Nations
into several major interventions. And yet, even
before September 11th, self-determination issues
had largely lost their central place in debates about
world affairs and U.S. foreign policy. The fast
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* This paper will discuss ethnic conflict and self-determination
movements within a common framework.  However, it should be
stressed that these phenomena are distinct from each other, and
there are variations within each category.  Self-determination move-
ments typically seek to create a new and separate state, semi-sover-
eign autonomous governing entity, or new political accommodation
and power-sharing arrangements, while ethnic conflict may occur in
a range of situations in which none of the parties involved are
explicitly seeking major changes in governance structures.  More-
over, the term “ethnic conflict,” as used in this paper and by many
other scholars, describes conflicts not just rooted in strict ethnic dif-
ferences, but also racial, linguistic, tribal and religious differences.
changing currents of these debates had carried elite
attention to other problems: managing globaliza-
tion and its backlash; trading off cold war arms
control agreements for the dream of national mis-
sile defense; dealing with growing Chinese power;
and so on. Before September 11th, even as interna-
tional aid workers worked to rebuild Kosovo and
Bosnia, and even as Macedonia teetered on the
brink of full-fledged ethnic warfare, self determina-
tion problems ceased to receive a great deal of
attention. 
While the emerging terms of the international
security debate after September 11th promise to fur-
ther marginalize self-determination issues, this
should not be the case. The new debate is still fluid
enough to be shaped. And if there is one critical
idea that should help frame post-September 11th
views of the world, it is this: Ethnic conflict and
quests for self-determination around the world are 
likely to be among the most important factors driving
international politics in the next decades. This phe-
nomenon, moreover, should not be seen as separate
from other global problems such as terrorism,
failed states, rivalry among great powers, access to
natural resources, and clashes between the modern
and the traditional, or between the rich and the
poor. Instead, self-determination issues weave
through many of these problems. In the years
ahead, self-determination movements and ethnic
rivalries are sure to produce a steady stream of dis-
crete conflicts that have little consequence beyond
horrible local bloodletting. But just as surely, these
movements will interact with a range of other glob-
al dynamics to create major challenges to peace and
stability. 
The events of September 11th and their aftermath
are indicative of the ways in which problems of
ethnic conflict operate below the radar in interna-
tional affairs to affect outcomes. Why was Afghan-
istan such a hospitable home to Osama bin Laden
and the al-Qaeda terrorist network? In part,
because ethnic rivalries helped ensure that Afghan-
istan became a failed state after the Soviet with-
drawal, which facilitated the rise of an extremist
regime willing to play host to an international ter-
rorist network. Why does al-Qaeda’s anti-Ameri-
canism resonate strongly in much of the Arab
world? In part, because of U.S. support for Israel,
where one of the most intractable ethnic conflicts
in the world has raged for years. What will deter-
mine the long-term success of efforts to rebuild
Afghanistan and ensure that the U.S. intervention
turns out to be a positive development for average
Afghans? In large part, the ability of different
Afghan ethnic groups to put aside their differences
and share power.
The events of September 11th and the war in
Afghanistan are not unique in the way that they
showcase the profound—yet often dimly
visible—influences of ethnic tensions in shaping
major developments in international affairs. Many
other pivotal events of the past can be viewed
through this same prism, and many crises and con-
flicts of the future will likewise unfold within
parameters set in part by the unmet aspirations or
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chauvinist prerogatives of particular ethnic groups. 
The discussion that follows is aimed at drawing
attention back to the problems of ethnic conflict
and self-determination in the 21st century. It offers
an exploration of the dimensions of this problem,
and the ways in which ethnic conflicts have had a
major impact on international security and U.S.
foreign policy since the end of the Cold War. Then
it examines the ways in which Afghanistan’s tragic
past and future fate have been shaped by the
dynamics of ethnic rivalry. Looking ahead, the
paper suggests how the United States and other
leading powers can more effectively respond to eth-
nic conflicts around the world. It also looks at the
role of international organizations and NGOs in
addressing self-determination challenges. 
A Formula for Conflict: Many Peoples,
Few Nations
In January 1993, Warren Christopher appeared
before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee at
his confirmation hearing to be Secretary of State. A
brutal war was raging in Bosnia, and many other
ethnic conflicts were simmering across the globe.
Commenting on this turmoil, Christopher noted a
ominous chasm in world politics: While there
existed thousands of distinctive ethnic or linguistic
groups, there were fewer than 200 countries, and
the vast majority of ethnic groups lived as minori-
ties in a state dominated by a majority group. This
math held the potential for many tragedies ahead.
Christopher raised the specter of unending con-
flicts like Bosnia if “we don’t find some way that
the different ethnic groups can live together in a
country.”1 That same year, Senator Daniel Patrick
Moynihan put the issue more sensationally: “The
defining mode of conflict in the era ahead is ethnic
conflict,” he argued. “It promises to be savage. Get
ready for 50 new countries in the world in the next
50 years. Most them will be born in bloodshed.”2
The 1990s bore out some of the most dire predic-
tions of those imagining a future of ethnic strife. In
many ways the history of violent conflict in the
post-Cold War era has been a history of ethnic
conflict.  
• 200,000 dead in Bosnia until a peace forged 
by American power ended the three-year war 
there in 1995; 
• 800,000 dead in Rwanda in 1994, Tutsi 
slaughtered by their Hutu countrymen while 
the international community did nothing; 
• up to 200,000 dead in Burundi during the 
1990s in fighting between and among Hutu 
and Tutsi factions; 
• thousands dead and several million displaced 
by Turkey’s brutal war on its Kurdish minori-
ty through the 1990s; 
• tens of thousands dead in Chechnya after 
Russian troops began a scorched earth crack
down in late 1994 on an armed secessionist 
movement;
• an explosion of long brewing ethnic tensions 
in Kosovo in 1998, with massive Serb repres-
sion of Albanians triggering NATO’s first- 
ever military campaign;
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• major ethnic violence in East Timor, as 
Indonesian troops end a 25-year occupation 
of the island, triggering an Australian-led 
U.N. military intervention; 
• unending bloodshed on the island nation of 
Sri Lanka, as the minority Tamil population 
stepped up its a long struggle for self-deter
mination;
• escalating violence in the Israel as a peace 
process to create a separate Palestinians state 
remains unresolved. 
This list could go on, and include a range of other
conflicts that have erupted since the end of the
Cold War. However, if we were to construct a list
of conflicts unrelated to ethnic rivalries since 1992,
it would be far shorter. Included on the list would
be: a minor border conflict between Ecuador and
Peru; escalating civil conflict in Columbia between
guerrilla groups, narco-terrorists and government
forces; the war between Ethiopia and Eritrea that
began in 1998; and several other conflicts in
Africa.
While the violent conflicts of the post-war era have
been largely driven by ethnic rivalry, two common
kinds of wars from earlier eras—interstate wars
between countries and insurgencies fueled by polit-
ical ideology—have become increasingly rare. In
1999, for example, the Stockholm International
Peace Research Institute reported that of the 27
armed conflicts it was monitoring worldwide, only
two were interstate conflicts.3
Does the dominance of ethnic violence in global
conflicts over the past decade mean that the same
pattern will hold over the next decade? This ques-
tion is difficult to answer. A number of the ethnic
conflicts after the Cold War can be seen as part of
a great wave of state fragmentation that accompa-
nied the collapse of Communism. These include
the ethnic conflicts in the former Yugoslavia, in
Chechnya and in other Caucasus states like Geor-
gia and Tajikistan. With the early post-Cold-War
era now in the past, many of these conflicts have
either been decisively resolved or at least moved
into a state of remission. However, other ethnic
conflicts of recent years have been only the latest
symptoms of long-running rivalries that have flared
and subsided periodically over the decades. For
example, Rwanda and Burundi have both seen sev-
eral episodes of mass killings since the early 1960s,
and the Palestinian-Israeli conflict likewise has
roots that precede the present era. 
Flashpoints of the Future
Looking ahead into the future, many of the ethnic
conflicts of the past decade have a high chance of
flaring up once more due to population pressures,
competition for resources and the weaknesses of
internal political structures. These same problems
may cause conflict or self-determination drives in
some ethically diverse states that have not recently
seen major conflict. Meanwhile, globalization has
the potential to exacerbate ethnic rivalries and self-
determination efforts by causing groups to empha-
size ethnic and communal bonds in the face of
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powerful external cultural, economic and political
forces. (It could also have the opposite effect of
breaking down ethnic identities in favor of other
identities more related to class and the market.)4
Possible flashpoints for conflict related to ethnic
conflict and self-determination include:
South Asia. The South Asian subcontinent is
among the most ethnically fragile regions in the
world and has recently shown signs of growing
instability. In late 2001 and early 2002, the long
simmering war in Kashmir escalated to new levels
of intensity and galvanized the attention of world
leaders. While this conflict is often characterized as
a territorial dispute, it is also a classic struggle for
self-determination, with Kashmir’s majority Mus-
lim population struggling against Indian Hindu
rule and getting support for this effort from Pak-
istan. The possession of nuclear weapons by both
Pakistan and India makes the Kashmir conflict
among the most dangerous self-determination
struggles in the world. Beyond the Kashmir con-
flict, South Asia is home to serious ethnic tensions
within Pakistan, which is divided by significant
ethnic and clan cleavages; and in India, where self-
determination struggles in the Punjab and other
regions periodically flare up, and where recent
Muslim-Hindu violence has the potential to under-
mine stability within the country. The ethnic con-
flict in Sri Lanka is also a long-standing problem. 
China. While the vast majority of China’s 1.2 bil-
lion people are Han Chinese, China contains sig-
nificant ethnic minorities and future self-determi-
nation efforts within China could have profoundly
destabilizing consequences. Most notably, a serious
secessionist bid by Tibet could bring the interna-
tional community and the United States into con-
flict with Beijing’s authoritarian government. Cur-
rently, no such secessionist bid is on the horizon,
and the indigenous population of Tibet continues
to grow weaker. However, if China moves in a
more democratic direction, it is likely to embolden
Tibetan opposition leaders and the situation could
deteriorate quickly. Another significant self-deter-
mination movement in China is that of the
Uighurs, a Muslim people of Turkic ethnicity who
live in Xinjiang in Western China (part of an area
the Uighurs refer to as Eastern Turkestan or
Uighuristan.) Over seven million Uighurs live in
China, and they have a long history of resisting
Chinese rule; twice, in 1933 and 1944, the
Uighurs temporarily constituted an Eastern Turk-
istan Republic. Over the past decade, protest activ-
ities against Chinese rule have been ongoing, and
Uighur representatives and human rights groups
have complained repeatedly about Chinese repres-
sion of Uighurs. Since September 11th, the Chinese
government has arrested many Uighurs and closed
mosques in Xinjiang, alleging ties between Uighur
activists and al-Qaeda. 
Indonesia. With the fourth largest population in
the world and significant natural resources,
Indonesia will help shape the future of all of
Southeast Asia. Yet Indonesia has long faced signif-
icant internal challenges, and these challenges have
worsened since President Suharto was forced from
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power in 1998 after 32 years of rule. Ethnic rival-
ries and self-determination claims rank high among
Indonesia’s many problems. Since 1976, the Ger-
akan Aceh Merk (GAM, Free Aceh Movement) has
sought an independent state in the Indonesian
province of Aceh, on the northern tip of Sumatra.
The conflict, which has claimed over 5,000 lives
since 1989, has yet to be permanently resolved.
Another separatist effort is underway in Papua,
where calls for independence have been growing
and conflict is increasing between separatists and
the Indonesian military. In addition to these con-
flicts, there are other areas of ethnic and religious
strife in Indonesia. In May 1998, the prosperous
ethnic Chinese minority in Indonesia was widely
attacked during rioting and roughly 150,000 Chi-
nese fled the country during this period. In Janu-
ary 1999, fighting between Christians and Muslims
in Ambon, the capital of Indonesia’s Maluku
province, brought on a near civil war that soon
spread to other parts of the province. As many as
10,000 people may have been killed and close to
700,000 became refugees.5
The Balkans. Recent ethnic fighting in the ethni-
cally divided nation of Macedonia, serves as a
reminder that the fracturing of the former
Yugoslavia along ethnic lines is a process not yet
complete. Beyond the potential of more conflict in
Macedonia, there is the possibility of conflict in
Montenegro, where Serbian rule is increasingly
challenged; Bosnia, where a lasting peace between
Serbs, Muslims, and Croats is far from assured; and
Kosovo, where violence has flared periodically
between pockets of remaining Serbs and the Alban-
ian majority. All future conflict in the former
Yugoslavia has the potential to once more draw in
NATO and the United Nations.
The Caucasus. The 1990s saw a host of ethnic
wars in the Caucasus, including two separatist con-
flicts in Georgia, a brutal and extended war in
Chechyna, and a long running war in the
Nagorno-Karabagh region of Azerbeijan. All of
these conflicts are now in abeyance but none have
been decisively resolved.
Great Lakes Region of Africa. Since 1959, Rwanda
and Burundi have been the scene of repeated out-
bursts of ethnic violence. The 1994 genocide in
Rwanda was by far the worst such outburst, but
there was also large-scale slaughter in one or the
other countries in the early 1960s, in 1972, and in
1988 and in 1993. This bloody historical record,
along with continuing instability, ongoing armed
warfare in Burundi, and long-term demographic
and economic pressures, suggests the high possibility
of future ethnic conflict in Rwanda and Burundi. 
Kurdistan. The 25-30 million Kurds of the Middle
East remain the largest group in the world without
their own state. Scattered through Turkey, Iran,
Iraq and Syria, the Kurds were promised a state in
the wake of World War I but these promises never
materialized. Periodic Kurdish rebellions have led
to ethnic wars both in Iraq and, most recently, in
Turkey, where the government waged a highly
repressive campaign against Kurdish separatists in
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southeastern Turkey during the 1990s. With none
of the states containing Kurds making any real
effort to accommodate their desires for autonomy,
new Kurdish uprisings in the 21st century would
seem inevitable. 
The Costs of Ethnic Conflict
While all ethnic conflicts are tragic, not all equally
threaten U.S. national security interests or the sta-
bility of the international system. Some ethnic con-
flicts can rage for years and have only a minor
impact outside the country being torn apart. The
two-decade civil war in Sri Lanka, for instance, has
had little impact on the outside world, even as it
has ruined a country and affected the lives of mil-
lions of Sri Lankans. In the years ahead, as in years
past, ethnic conflicts will greatly differ in their
implications for outsiders. At their most dangerous,
future ethnic conflicts are likely to pose profound
security threats to the United States and important
allies. These conflicts may also produce a range of
negative spillover affects. The bad things that can
arise from ethnic conflicts and threaten outside
parties include:
Terrorism. Lacking the military capacity for con-
ventional war, minority groups pursuing self-deter-
mination often resort to terrorist tactics of warfare
—the “weapons of the weak.” Indeed, much of the
history of terrorism over the past quarter century
reflects ethnic struggle: recent bombings in Israel
by Palestinians and, earlier, airplane hijackings by
Palestinians during the 1980s; bombings in Eng-
land by the Irish Republican Army; bombings in
Spain by Basque separatists; bombings in India by
the Tamil Tigers; and bombings in Russia by
Chechen separatists.6 Also, the attacks of Septem-
ber 11th— as well as the earlier attacks on U.S.
embassies in Kenya and Tanzania, the U.S. bar-
racks in Saudi Arabia and the U.S.S. Cole in
Yemen—can be seen as partly related to an ethnic
conflict. Sympathy for the Palestinian cause has
been a central hallmark of various Islamic terror-
ists, including Al-Qaeda. While most terrorist
attacks are narrowly targeted, such attacks have a
long history of claiming innocent bystanders as
their victims, including Americans. With terrorists
potentially turning to weapons of mass destruction
in future years, the likelihood of wider and more
indiscriminate carnage from terrorism related to
self determination struggles will grow.  
Conflict Between Major Powers. Ethnic conflicts
that begin at a small level can and do draw in
major outside powers. The result can be that inter-
nal conflicts produce major tensions and the threat
of violence among outside powers. During the
1990s, U.S. and NATO intervention in the Balka-
ns created significant tensions between the U.S.
and Russia, which was allied with Serbia. NATO’s
intervention in Kosovo also created a major rift in
U.S.- Chinese relations when an American bomber
accidentally destroyed the Chinese embassy in Bel-
grade. During the 1980s, the civil war in Lebanon
drew in Israel, the United States, Syria, France and
Great Britain. In the future, a range of simmering
hotspots could well explode in ways that produce
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conflict between major powers. For example,
although the probability is low, conflict between
ethnic Russians living in the Baltic states (primarily
Estonia, and Latvia) and the majority populations
in those states, could bring the United States and
Russia into direct conflict as Russia moves to
defend its people in sovereign countries that have
close ties with the United States. Likewise, in Asia,
repression of future Tibetan or Uighuran self-deter-
mination efforts could trigger clashes between
China and outside powers.  
Creation of Failed States. An important lesson of
recent decades is that failed states without strong
central government pose significant dangers
because they can become safe havens for terrorists
and other rogue elements. Ethnic conflicts and self-
determination movements, with their potential to
rip governance structures apart, can create failed
states. In the 1970s, after Lebanon descended into
civil war, the country became a haven for a wide
range of terrorist groups, as well as for drug pro-
ducers and arms smugglers. As mentioned earlier,
Afghanistan came to have many characteristics of a
failed state following years of battle between differ-
ent ethnic groups—and this facilitated the rise of
the Taliban, which played host to al-Qaeda. A
number of countries with simmering ethnic ten-
sions today have the potential to be the failed states
of tomorrow, including Pakistan and Indonesia.
Moreover, an important consideration in U.S. poli-
cy toward Iraq is wariness that the fall of Saddam
Hussein could produce a new and unstable failed
state, with ongoing conflicts between the country’s
three major groups: Kurds, Sunni Muslims, and
Shiite Muslims. 
Access to Resources. Ethnic conflicts that take
place in resource rich areas can disrupt or limit the
flow of resources to outside users. For example, a
major reason that the oil reserves of the Caspian
Sea remain underexploited is because they are adja-
cent to the zone of ethnic conflicts in the Cauca-
sus. This has greatly complicated the challenge of
building or maintaining oil pipelines to carry oil
from the Caspian overland east to the Black Sea,
where it can be loaded onto tankers. The supply of
diamonds and other minerals has also been dis-
rupted due to internal conflicts in Africa. 
Diverted Internationalist Attention. Beyond the
specific negative impacts that ethnic conflicts can
have, as just discussed, these conflicts can take a
toll on the world in a more general way by spark-
ing crises that demand attention and management.
In a world with less armed conflict, international
leaders and institutions can focus proactively on
building a better world order through more trade
and economic development, as well through envi-
ronmental protection and other positive initiatives.
But in a world with a steady stream of crises and
conflicts, the energies of world leaders and
resources of international institutions get caught up
in damage control and less attention is paid to
long-terms efforts to create a stronger international
order. 
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Afghanistan: Ethnic Rivalries, Global
Consequences
In the fall of 2001, as the world focused on the war
in Afghanistan, much attention was given to the
complexity of the country’s ethnic makeup. This
complexity came as a surprise to casual observers of
foreign affairs. After all, pre-September 11th,
Afghanistan didn’t look all that complicated: the
Soviets had tried to dominate the country for a
decade and had been driven out. Afterwards, rival
guerrilla groups had slugged it out among them-
selves for a while—victors fighting for spoils in
seemingly typical fashion—until the super-Islamic
Taliban had risen to power. From afar, the distinc-
tive feature of the Taliban seemed to be their funda-
mentalism, but in reality, their ethnicity as Pashtuns
was a major factor in their cohesion. Still, in the
1990s, the story of Afghanistan appeared to be just
another story of a country hijacked by extremists.  
Wrong. As the American public learned more
about Afghanistan and its rivalries among ethnic
groups and warlords, both the country’s history
and its future began to look a lot more complicat-
ed. With a fragile coalition government working to
create a lasting peace in Afghanistan, and U.S.
leaders deciding on America’s future role in the
country, the dynamics of Afghanistan’s ethnic rival-
ries are critical to understand.
Afghan politics has long been characterized by eth-
nic competition. This competition reflects the
country’s diverse ethnic makeup: today, roughly 38
percent of Afghans are Pashtun, who live mainly in
the south; 25 percent are Tajik, living mainly in
the north; 19 percent are Hazara, living mostly in
central Afghanistan; another 6 percent are Uzbek,
also living in the north; and the remaining 12 per-
cent area variety of minor ethnic groups, including
Aimaks, Turkmen and Baloch.7 Like many coun-
tries with ethnic tensions, Afghanistan has a state
with borders that don’t reflect ethnic realities—in
this case, a state created at the end of the 19th cen-
tury by the British Empire. As Marina Ottaway
and Anatol Lieven have written: “The Afghan state
is a recent, partly colonial creation that has never
commanded the full loyalty of its own citizens.
Even today, many—perhaps most—Afghans give
their primary allegiance to local leaders, ethnic
groups, and tribes.”8
Over the past two centuries, the Pashtun have been
the principle leaders of efforts to build a modern
central state in Afghanistan. These efforts yielded
considerable success from 1880 through 1980, as
Afghanistan developed into a modern nation-state.
But they also triggered periodic resistance from
other Afghan ethnic groups, who resented Pashtun
dominance, as well as uneasiness in neighboring
Pakistan, home to many Pashtuns, which feared
efforts to create a united “Pashtunistan” carved
from Afghanistan and Pakistan and having access
to the Indian Ocean. Pakistan’s fear of the cause of
Pashtunistan shaped its policies toward Afghanistan
during the 1980s and 1990s. As Afghan scholar
Vartan Gregorian has written, “Pakistan has bril-
liantly used the call of Islam to sideline the nation-
alist aspirations of Pashtuns and irredentist policies
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of Afghanistan by framing the struggle in larger,
global terms.”9 In the mid-1990s, the fundamental-
ist Taliban offered the ideal vehicle for this effort,
and Pakistan backed the Taliban’s successful rise to
power. By 1996, the Taliban—made up mainly of
Pashtuns—were successful in controlling much of
the country. However, resistance remained and was
manifested along ethnic lines, with the ranks of the
Northern Alliance made up mostly of Tajiks and
Uzbeks.
Ongoing fighting between the Taliban and its
adversaries through the late 1990s helped ensure
that Afghanistan remained an impoverished, failed
state. This environment provided a perfect refuge
for al-Qaeda, whose presence was welcomed by a
Taliban leadership eager for additional resources to
deploy against its adversaries. The Taliban’s
embrace of al-Qaeda also reflected its desire to be
less dependent on Pakistan.
As the international community confronts the
daunting challenge of building a stable
Afghanistan, the ethnic dimensions of a lasting
peace must be carefully calibrated. Enduring dis-
trust between different ethnic groups, as well as
between different warlords and armed factions,
makes it difficult to move Afghanistan easily down
the road toward a modern democratic state.
Inevitably, any new central state in Afghanistan
with significant resources and powers will be the
focal point for distrust and struggle. In both the
near and long term, “a reconciliation government
must be established that is truly inclusive,” writes
Gregorian. This government must not be seen as a
puppet of the United States or the Northern
Alliance, and must reflect the Pashtuns’ central role
in Afghanistan. “Pashtuns won’t easily relinquish
two centuries of memory and power,” Gregorian
argues. “Without a major Pashtun role in the
future of Afghanistan, there will be no viable
peace.”10 Gregorian also emphasizes that steps
should be taken to allay Pakistan’s historic concerns
about the quest for an independent Pashtunistan.
Another critical ingredient for success in postwar
Afghanistan is a significant and lasting outside mil-
itary presence that could keep new group conflict
at bay, as well as large amounts of international
assistance.11 Many agree that the United Nations
should take the lead over the long term in the
reconstruction efforts. So far, however, a major
military presence has not been put into place and
reconstruction efforts have moved forward only
slowly. Many blame the United States for a critical
failure of leadership. As Afghan expert Barnett R.
Rubin wrote in April 2002, “both Afghans and
international officials see the [U.S.] refusal to
expand the international force as the start of Amer-
ican disengagement, repeating the mistake of the
1990’s despite promises to learn from that experi-
ence.”12 Rubin and other observers stress that the
United States and the international community
must make a far larger commitment to stabilizing
Afghanistan if it is not to remain a permanently
failed state with ongoing ethnic and factional con-
flicts, as well as enormous human suffering.
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An Impossible Task? Managing 
Ethnic Conflict 
Whether in Afghanistan or elsewhere, conflicts
rooted in self-determination drives or ethnic rivalry
are notoriously difficult to resolve. The claims and
counterclaims driving these conflicts can stretch
back centuries, and may be deeply ingrained in the
culture of competing groups. In the Balkans, con-
flict between Muslims, Serbs and Croats have their
roots in the 14th century conquest of southern
Europe by Ottoman armies. In the Great Lakes
region of Africa, conflict between Hutu and Tutsi
reflects dynamics of competition that can be traced
back to the tactics of Belgium’s colonial adminis-
tration. The list of other ethnic conflicts with
ancient antecedents could go and on, as could a list
of modern states concocted by colonial masters
with borders that do not reflect ethnic or tribal
boundaries. 
At the same time, ethnic violence is not a phenom-
enon that is preordained by history or geography.
In many states, different ethnic groups have lived
together harmoniously for decades and, around the
world, difficult self-determination disputes have
been settled in a peaceful fashion. History demon-
strates that there are many solutions to ethnic rival-
ries beyond dividing countries into separate states
along ethnic lines. Examples of power-sharing
through history include the dual monarchy of the
Austro-Hungarian empire, the confessional democ-
racy of Lebanon, and the multi-ethnic confederal
systems of Switzerland and Canada. While many
power-sharing arrangements have proven unsuc-
cessful in the long run, they nevertheless offer les-
sons and ideas to draw from in developing such
arrangements in the future. 
Beyond more distant historical examples, the inter-
national community has a growing body of more
recent knowledge and experience when it comes to
dealing with ethnic conflict and self-determination
movements. These insights—which come from
dozens of conflicts over the past decade and before
—can help guide responses in two general cate-
gories: prediction and prevention; and intervention
and reconstruction. 
Prediction and Prevention
Self-determination bids and ethnic rivalries are
infinitely harder to resolve once they have turned
into full-fledged wars. Typically, however, the out-
break of fighting is preceded by years of growing
tensions and often there are opportunities for out-
side parties to play a constructive role in defusing
these tensions. Today, as a result of hard-learned
lessons from past ethnic conflicts, the international
community knows a great deal both about predict-
ing and preventing ethnic conflicts.
Prediction. Not every ethnically diverse state is a
powder keg waiting to explode. Conversely, a state
that appears stable may in fact be quite fragile.
There are three chief factors that point to the pos-
sibility of ethnic violence: a history of state repres-
sion of an ethnic minority or encouragement of
violence toward a minority; a history of violence
among ethnic groups; and the existence of ethnic
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pockets within newly independent states. None of
these conditions guarantees violence and it impos-
sible to devise a reliable formula for predicting eth-
nic warfare. Still, most of the major ethnic conflicts
of the 1990s were hardly surprising viewed through
the lens of these factors. The upsurge of the Kur-
dish insurgency in Turkey during the early 1990s
was a classic example of a conflict brought on by
growing state repression of an ethnic group’s cul-
ture. Other examples of state repression leading to
ethnic violence during the 1990s include the wors-
ening of violence in Indian-controlled Kashmir in
the face of high levels of separatist activity, much of
it abetted by Pakistan; the growing militancy of
Palestinians in the occupied territories, where
Israeli interventions were common during the
1980s and 1990s as it sought to ensure internal
security; and the rise of Albanian militancy both in
Kosovo under harsh Serbian rule during the 1990s
and in Macedonia, where ethnic Albanians also felt
mistreated. 
Other ethnic conflicts during the 1990s arose due
to the existence of ethnic pockets in newly inde-
pendent states, including in the former Yugoslavia,
where Serbs and Croats found themselves in states
ruled by other ethnic groups; and in Azerbaijan,
where Armenians in the Nagorno-Karabagh region
worked to overturn their minority status. Tensions
also surrounded pockets of ethnic Russians in the
Baltic states and in Ukraine, as well as the problem
of some two million ethnic Hungarians living in
Slovakia and Romania. In Rwanda and Burundi,
the Hutu and Tutsi generally live side by side,
rather than in pockets. But, in both these coun-
tries, a long history of bloodshed between the two
groups and enduring enmity made the countries
ripe for new violence. 
Prevention. An understanding of the factors lead-
ing to ethnic conflicts suggests clear strategies of
prevention. Patterns of state repression of ethnic
minorities can be met with a human rights strategy
of documenting abuses and penalizing govern-
ments through sanctions or other forms of punish-
ment. By pressuring state governments to reduce
repression, the international community can help
reduce the urgency of a secessionist effort. The past
decade has seen the emergence of a growing body
of law and new institutional arrangements that
provide the international community with fresh
levers for advancing change. These include the cre-
ation within the Organization for Co-Operation
and Security in Europe (OSCE) of a High Com-
missioner on National Minorities, the adoption of
the U.N. Declaration on Minorities of December
1992, and new precedents involving the extradi-
tion and prosecution of those who engage in
human rights abuses. In addition, human rights
advocates have been working to increase the rele-
vance and applicability of existing international
agreements, such as the 1948 Convention on the
Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Geno-
cide. Still, much more needs to be done to create
the kind of robust transnational human rights
regime that can offer maximum protection to
minorities and help prevent ethnic rivalries from
turning deadly. 
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as no surprise given the demands on the time of
top national security officials in the U.S. and other
western countries, who often have their hands full
dealing with a variety of other international chal-
lenges. Also, emerging ethnic conflicts often do not
attract attention because they take place in regions
of the world that are not seen as vital to the inter-
ests of leading world powers. In these cases, even
full knowledge of impending bloodshed may result
in little or no action because of a lack of political
will.
One key to effective prediction and prevention is
to appreciate a hard-learned lesson of the 1990s,
namely that conflicts in seemingly unimportant
places can undermine global security or create situ-
ations that western nations feel they must respond
to. While no western nation had vital interests in
Rwanda, the massive humanitarian disaster of the
genocide and subsequent refugee crisis was such
that a costly international intervention became
unavoidable. The United States alone spent several
billion dollars during this intervention. It is infi-
nitely less costly to defuse a nascent crisis than to
deal with the fallout of a major conflict. 
Another key to prediction and prevention is to
make far greater resources available to these tasks.
In the United States, budget cuts affecting the
diplomatic service and the concentration of intelli-
gence resources on first order national security
threats (e.g., nuclear proliferation) have left the
U.S. without the resources to adequately monitor
many regions of the world, such as Central Asia
13
The problem of distinct ethnic pockets in states
can be dealt with through power sharing arrange-
ments within central governments and/or strategies
of semi-sovereignty, whereby ethnic regions are
given significant autonomy in an “historical home-
land” to run their own affairs. Homeland regimes
can ensure culture rights, particularly around lan-
guage and education, which are common areas of
minority grievance.13 In Eastern Europe and else-
where, there are several successful examples where
the international community has helped develop
internal guarantees of minority rights that have
defused growing ethnic tensions, including a suc-
cessful effort in the 1990s to ensure the political
and cultural rights of some 600,000 Hungarians
living in Rumania.
Overall, in the wake of the 1990s, with its intense
ethnic conflicts, the international community is
now far better at seeing these conflicts coming and
taking steps to defuse them. Still, the ability to
predict and prevent conflict counts for little if
international leaders do not have an emerging con-
flict on their radar. All too often, in the 1990s,
simmering crises only attracted the attention of
low-level diplomats from the United States and
elsewhere—and failed to command the urgent
attention of top leaders. In Rwanda, the ominous
developments leading up to the 1994 genocide
were tracked closely by U.N. forces in Rwanda and
some western diplomats. But warnings of an
impending cataclysm went unheeded at the highest
levels of western governments. The same pattern
can be seen in other conflicts. Such neglect comes
and Africa. The United Nations’ perpetual fiscal
crisis has also severely limited the power of that
institution to discharge its mandate of preventive
diplomacy, and the U.N. has not been able to
enact proposals that have been put forth to give the
Secretary General far more capacity to actively
monitor conflicts and engage in conflict resolution
activities. Meanwhile, regional collective security
organizations like the Organization of African
Unity also lack resources or are underdeveloped
institutionally. A new commitment is needed
—within the United States, but also internationally
—to find the resources necessary to ensure more
effective responses to emerging crises. Over the
long run, such an investment will more than pay
for itself. 
Intervention and Reconstruction
Even in an ideal world, the best and most proactive
efforts at prediction and prevention will often fail.
When ethnic conflicts occur, the international
community faces difficult choices about how to
stop the violence and create a lasting peace. Over
the past several decades, the history of outside
intervention in ethnic conflicts has been one of
mixed success, and it is impossible to underesti-
mate the challenges of defusing such conflicts and
rebuilding divided, war-torn nations. But, just as
the United States and its allies have learned much
about how to predict and prevent ethnic conflicts,
so too have many useful lessons been learned about
intervention and reconstruction.
Intervention. A fundamental obstacle to effective
intervention by outside powers in an ethnic con-
flict is that few outsiders want to incur the risks
that such intervention entails. In the United States
and other western nations, national leaders face sig-
nificant political pressures to avoid foreign entan-
glements that might result in military casualties. To
put soldiers in harm’s way, and to possibly have
flag-draped coffins arrive from overseas, is a step
hard to justify except if vital national interests are
at stake. Yet most of the ethnic conflicts of the past
decade have not directly threatened the vital
national interests of major outside powers. The
Rwanda genocide, as discussed, was a human
tragedy almost beyond imagination—but one that
did not directly impinge upon the vital economic
or political interests of leading outside powers.
Even the Bosnian conflict, the worst violence in
Europe since World War II, did not pose enough
of a threat to the vital interests of NATO countries
to trigger prompt intervention. Looking to the
future, ethnic violence inside Pakistan or India or
Indonesia or a slew of smaller, less important states
may well not be seen as posing direct threats to the
interests of major outside powers.
To be sure, there will always be instances where
outside powers muster the moral wherewithal to
intervene in internal conflicts that do not impinge
on vital interests. America’s intervention in Soma-
lia, the eventual NATO intervention in Bosnia,
and the NATO intervention in Kosovo, show that
humanitarian principles are not entirely absent
from the calculus of intervention. And, more than
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ever, the growing effectiveness of airpower in com-
bination with advanced intelligence-gathering
capabilities, hold out the promise of military inter-
vention with reduced risks. Still, looking ahead, it
is likely that outside intervention in future ethnic
conflicts will often come too late, if at all, and new
instances of massive human suffering will go
unstopped—unless fundamental changes are made
in the global collective security system.  
To deal effectively with future ethnic conflicts, the
international community must create a way to
intervene in these conflicts that does not force the
leaders of outside powers to ask whether vital inter-
ests are at stake. One crucial step is to transform
the collective security powers of the United
Nations. Currently, U.N. peacekeeping forces are
made up of contingents from national armies—
with contributing countries typically very cautious
about being part of missions that might incur casu-
alties in places where no vital interests are at stake.
To be effective in conflicts that threaten only
humanitarian principles or international stability
generally—but no single nation’s vital
interests—many have argued that the United
Nations needs its own rapid deployment force.
Different visions exist for such a force, but it has
been frequently proposed that such a force would
be made up of volunteer military professionals
drawn from a wide variety of countries so that the
casualties incurred by this force would not have
political consequences for any national leaders. The
force would be under the command of the U.N.
Security Council and, specifically, the Council’s
Military Subcommittee, which includes representa-
tives of the five permanent members—all of whom
would have a veto over the force’s operations.14
Is a standing U.N. military force a pipe dream?
Right now, probably so, given the U.N.’s lack of
financial resources, its internal management prob-
lems, and the great hesitation on the part of the
United States and other countries to truly empow-
er this institution. Yet, over a half century ago, the
far-sighted architects of the U.N. put into place
the rules and infrastructure needed to develop and
manage a U.N. military capability with real teeth.
Perhaps the central lesson of the past decade of
internal conflicts—at least in this author’s view—is
that the time has come to act on the latent promise
of the U.N. Charter.
Reconstruction. As a long effort begins to recon-
struct Afghanistan, and as new challenges of nation
building are confronted in the years to come, the
international community has an increasingly large
body of knowledge to draw from about how to
bring peace to countries torn by internal conflict.
Today, international efforts are underway to heal a
number of nations, including Bosnia, Kosovo,
Northern Ireland and Rwanda. Past efforts at
nation building include international missions in
Somalia, Lebanon and West Africa. The experience
of these efforts does not readily offer up easy for-
mulas for success. But a number of lessons are
clear. First and foremost is the imperative of money
and patience. Reconstruction is a long and expen-
sive endeavor—often taking many years—and to
walk away too early is to risk a renewal of violence.
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A central challenge for outside powers is to work to
maintain domestic support for nation-building
efforts and to ensure that money is available to make
good on promises of reconstruction assistance. 
Second, and equally critical, is the need for a long-
time outside military presence, in most cases. As
the world has learned in Bosnia and elsewhere,
peacekeeping missions may need to go on for
many years to ensure that peace agreements are
enforced, warring parties remain separated and
security is maintained on the ground. 
A third basic imperative of reconstruction is to
properly manage nation-building efforts. The
recent history of reconstruction efforts in Bosnia
and Kosovo is replete with stories of stunning
bureaucratic ineptitude, with multiple national and
international agencies stumbling all over each other
and failing to work together in a timely and effec-
tive fashion. Afghanistan is now beset by the same
problems, by many reports. Also worrisome in past
experiences has been the egregious levels of corrup-
tion that often characterize reconstruction authori-
ties, with vast amounts of international money disap-
pearing. This unfortunate history points to the need
to reinvent and strengthen both national and inter-
national aid agencies, along with the necessity of
continuing to address the profound management
problems that exist within the United Nations.
Finally, it is not enough to simply get better at the
basic mechanics of peacekeeping and reconstruc-
tion. The international community must also bet-
ter utilize and deploy the growing body of knowl-
edge about how to reconstitute civil society, defuse
longstanding hatred between ethnic groups, and to
create governing structures that ensure the rights of
minorities. These challenges, of course, are the
most difficult of all. Yet if the political will exists to
commit to long-term nation building, it is increas-
ingly the case that tested solutions exist to the
problems of divided societies. 
Conclusion
Issues of self-determination and ethnic conflict are
among the most challenging problems facing inter-
national leaders. The recent escalation of conflict
in the Middle East between the Israelis and Pales-
tinians underscores the nightmarish quality of
internal conflicts rooted in historic rivalries and
shared ancestral territory. What is particularly trou-
bling about these problems are the profound limits
of even the most enlightened and well-crafted poli-
cies. In the 1990s, for example, active outside
efforts to monitor tensions in Kosovo and prevent
a major war there failed, leading NATO to inter-
vene in early 1999. The United States was particu-
larly involved in preventive efforts in Kosovo—
issuing warnings to Serb leaders to restrain their
actions, deploying U.S. forces in neighboring
Macedonia, and helping engage the resources of
the OSCE and U.N. to respond to human rights
abuses and explore alternative to violence. Still,
Kosovo exploded into war. 
As significant as the obstacles are to resolving inter-
nal conflicts, they are far greater when the United
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States and others in the international community
do not tap all the knowledge available to them.
Too often, hard-learned lessons from previous con-
flicts are not applied to new conflicts and, as may
be the case with current U.S. policy toward
Afghanistan, mistakes are repeated. In particular, a
major disconnect exists between the growing body
of scholarship on ethnic conflict, intervention, and
nation-building—and the policymaking organs of
national and international institutions. In truth,
however, the greatest disconnect exists between
what policymakers know should be done in this
area and what they can or will do given limitations
on political capital and financial resources. No-
where is this more true than in Washington, D.C.,
where U.S. political leaders seem to live in a per-
petual state of denial about the considerable finan-
cial resources and high-level attention that ethnic
conflict and self-determination issues demand. This
denial leaves policymakers frequently behind the
curve of conflicts, reacting to developments rather
than anticipating and shaping developments. 
One cannot blame policymakers for wishing that
these problems “from hell,” as Warren Christopher
once described Bosnia, would somehow just van-
ish. Unfortunately, in the years ahead, the chal-
lenges posed by self-determination quests and eth-
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